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As computer sof tware has become increasingly cent ral to commerce and
creat ivit y, lawmakers have ret rof it ted it  into preexist ing legal regimes to
regulate it s product ion and dist ribut ion. Current ly in the United States,
sof tware is eligible for protect ion under patent  law, copyright  law, t rade
secret  law and the First  Amendment . Legal determinat ions of  technology such
as sof tware do much to shape it s legacy, uses and scope, as recent  work in
the history of  patent  prosecut ion suggests. 1 But  the protean nature of
computer code, which comprises sof tware, has made it  part icularly
challenging for lawmakers to pin down: computer code is variously t reated as
text , speech, or machine under US law. 2 Which legal metaphor prevails in any
given case is cont ingent  upon the part icular context  in which code is operat ing
—its composer, it s audience, and the nature and uses of  the sof tware it
comprises. The rhetorical-legal const ruct ion of  these various metaphors
illust rate the complexit y and f lexibilit y of  code—at  once expressive,
funct ional, polit ical, and lit erary—as well as the populat ions lawmakers
imagine to be producing and consuming code. Each of  these metaphors
highlights a dif ferent  property of  code, and together they form a set  of
ontologies for code.
This art icle examines three classif icatory metaphors for computer code as
they are established in the US legal system. To examine these legal
metaphors for code, I draw on the social history of  technology, theoret ical
work in judicial reasoning, and legal and cultural debates about  the dif ferent
kinds of  intellectual property protect ion appropriate for computer code. 3 The
tensions in code’s legal def init ion highlights it s protean nature but  also it s
shif t ing cast  of  uses, users, and producers. Yet  legal def init ions do not  fully
determine computer code: some writers of  code can and do circumvent  it s
legal st rictures. In these moments, which I visit  at  the end of  this art icle, we
can see how people might  contest  legal metaphors as a new technology is
being put  to new uses. The uniquely complex features of  computer code,
coupled with it s well-documented legal history, makes it  an ideal case study
for how new technologies are def ined and shaped by the law.
Various US court  decisions, legislat ive records, and law review art icles
catalogue the const ruct ion of  these metaphors and provide the cent ral
sources for my analysis. Narrowing the scope to US law is pract ical as well as
st rategic: the concent rat ion of  high-technology f irms in the US as well as it s
posit ion in global economics and polit ics has meant  that  US law of ten sets the
terms for internat ional law in intellectual property and new technology. I take a
rhetorical approach to these US documents, which allows me to analyze
lawmakers’ assumpt ions about  the users, producers and funct ions of
computer code. I begin by out lining this approach and then move to my
analysis of  the three cent ral metaphors that  have emerged for code in law:
code as text , code as speech, and code as machine. Each of  these rhetorical-
legal const ruct ions of  code is an ontology of  code—a snapshot  of  what  code
looks like f rom one perspect ive, extended metaphorically to it s closest
counterpart  with legal precedence.
When new technologies meet legal precedence
Lawmakers 4 rely on precedent  for regulat ion, so they of ten devise
metaphors to bridge new technologies to those previously established and
regulated. Somet imes these metaphors help to conveying a judicial decision
f igurat ively, somet imes they help lawmakers reason through a new and
complex technology, and somet imes they set  the terms by which a new
technology is governed. Whatever their funct ion in legal discourse, metaphors
can illuminate the unstable ident it ies for technologies when they are new—
before their uses become well-worn grooves through culture and
communicat ion. 5 For instance, Thomas Edison’s phonograph was f irst
classif ied as a ‘Measuring Inst rument ’ by the United States Patent  Of f ice in
1878 because it s primary funct ion at  the t ime was deemed closest  to the
documentary funct ion of  shorthand. The phonograph pushed the limit s of  this
patent  category, however, and it s later reclassif icat ion under a new
‘Acoust ics’ patent  signaled it s new uses as an entertainment  device. 6 The
phonograph’s shif t ing classif icat ion illust rates the way that  legal metaphors
for new technologies can help us chart  the path a new technology takes
through dif ferent  funct ions, audiences, and means of  product ion.
Figurat ively, metaphors appear in court  decisions to explain or highlight
certain ideas, just  as they do in academic discourse. But , in the law,
metaphors can also serve as act ionable language. Cent ral metaphors for
technologies can set  the terms of  legal discourse, init iat ing terms or def ining
them, therefore shaping the ways that  subsequent  subjects are t reated under
the law. 7 For instance, Nard, Barnes and Madison insist  that  ‘copyright
implicat ions […] depend in part  on the lawyers’ and judges’ select ion of  the
“right ” analogy or metaphor.’ 8 These legal scholars note that  although
copyright  law has been extended to sof tware, copyright  operates with a basic
paradigm of  print : ‘As forms and formats have expanded, the scope of
copyright  law has expanded as well, but  the underlying policies of  the law st ill
implicit ly assume that  authors and publishers, and readers follow the well-
understood and established pat terns of  act ivit y’ (ibid., 387). Referring to this
legal pract ice of  relat ing new situat ions to established pat terns of  act ivit y,
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca use the term ‘metaphorical
fusion,’ a pract ice which ‘consecrate[s] the relat ion between’ the terms under
discussion. 9 In other words, legal metaphors can move beyond the f igurat ive
bridging of  ideas to determine the governance of  new pract ices—to const ruct
ontologies of  new technologies. In our case of  computer code, the metaphors
of  text , speech and machine that  lawmakers deploy can, at  least  under law,
render code into a text , speech or machine.
As lawmakers const ruct  metaphors to f it  code or any new technology into
preexist ing paradigms, they imagine legal subjects for the new precedents or
statutes they craf t . They must  ask: whom this law will af fect? Whose
act ivit ies will it  promote and whose act ivit ies will it  proscribe? In other words,
the making of  laws implicates certain users and producers—in rhetorical
terms, an audience—of  a new technology. 10 James Grimmelmann explains
how the const ruct ion of  this audience of  legal subjects draws on social
factors: ‘Every body of  law has an internal logic to it , a logic drawn f rom and
ref lected in the social relat ionships it  imagines among the people subject  to
it .’ 11 These socially-shaped visions of ten rely on some paradigmat ic, ‘normal’
group, such as the ‘average member of  the public’ to whom Just ice Stevens
referred in Sony v. Universal, the decision allowing users of  video tape
recording technology (e.g., Betamax) to record broadcasted programs.
Through a concept  of  ‘normal’ people, lawmakers’ imaginat ions of  legal
subjects can render some uses, users, and producers of  new technologies
more paradigmat ic than others, thereby shaping the ef fect ive uses, users,
and producers of  new technologies. 12
Ideally, at  least , lawmakers aspire to write decisions and policies whose
precedent  will extend beyond one specif ic case; ideally, they aim at
universalit y and t imelessness for their rhetorical const ruct ions of  audience. Of
course, no audience or rhetorical const ruct ion can be object ively universal or
t imeless. But , as many legal theorists have argued, the subject ive
const ruct ion of  universalit y is at  the heart  of  the judicial process.13 This
universalizing of  subject ive norms is the f ramework for Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ‘universal audience,’ in which the ‘normal (in the law) is
determined by one or more reference groups.’14 Somet imes these
hypothet ical reference groups are explicit ly invoked in legal code and
precedent . For example, the ‘reasonable person’ in tort  law can help
determine negligence and, in patent  law, the ‘person having ordinary skill in the
art ’ (PHOSITA) can help determine an invent ion’s patentabilit y.15 Although
these hypothet ical const ruct ions of  the ‘reasonable person’ and the PHOSITA
shif t  across history and context , they are nonetheless codif ied in the law. This
legal codif icat ion of  ‘normal’ people in the ‘universal audience’ can serve to
naturalize certain assumpt ions within an argument .16
The concept  of  the ‘universal audience’ enables me to uncover the various
polit ical, historical, and cultural processes that  were present  at  the genesis of
each of  our three legal metaphors for code because, as Antonio de Velasco
argues, ‘the universal audience can be seen as that  always potent ially
contested—and thus always polit ical—site of  appeal through which t ruths,
facts, and presumpt ions emerge in various contexts of  symbolic
product ion.’17 In the legal contexts examined below, the symbolic product ion
of  laws concerning computer code reveals lawmakers’ visions of  their
‘universal audience’—the collect ivit y they imagined to be subject  to the new
precedents they set . In other words, as lawmakers determine which
precedents best  f it  t he part icular version of  code under debate, they envision
who can or should write code. This vision interacts with actual uses of  code in
complicated ways—from programmers’ decisions about  what  code to make
open source, to uses of  code in cryptography, to how companies are legally
permit ted to interact  with each others’ code—and a full examinat ion of  these
implicat ions is beyond my means here. Here I focus on the tensions between
lawmakers’ visions of  who should write code and who actually does write
code, and through three metaphors employed for code—code as text ,
speech, or machine—I explore disparit ies between the populat ions of  those
who write code and those for whom the law is writ ten.
Computer code as text
Congress amended the 1976 Copyright  Act  in 1980 to def ine computer code
as a ‘lit erary work.’ In establishing this textual metaphor for code, historically
the f irst  of  our three legal metaphors, Congress was responding to
recommendat ions f rom The Nat ional Commission on New Technological Uses
of  Copyrighted Works (CONTU). Congress commissioned CONTU in 1974 to
respond to concerns of  the rapidly growing sof tware indust ry as well as to
address mount ing issues in copyright  law brought  about  by computer
technology. The US Copyright  Of f ice had permit ted copyright  regist rat ion for
code since 1964, but  this pract ice had not  been of f icially recognized in
copyright  statute and it s merit s had been debated.18 Posit ing code as a ‘form
of  writ ing,’ CONTU’s Final Report  recommended that  copyright  was, indeed, a
suitable form of  intellectual property protect ion for code.19 By 1990, legal
scholars contended that  copyright  for code was ‘proving to be an ef fect ive
and uncont roversial means for protect ing program code f rom exact
duplicat ion’ and ‘virtually all nat ions [had] recognized the textual character of
program code in deciding to use copyright  law to protect  it .’20 But  at  the t ime,
CONTU’s recommendat ions were content ious among members of  the
commission as well as legal experts.21 Examining the debates as this
metaphor was being established can tell us much about  how code was
operat ing in US society in the mid-1970s.
Cont roversy centered on CONTU’s recommendat ion that  machine-readable
computer code22 should be copyrightable. That  is, the cont roversy centered
on establishing the audience for computer code.23 CONTU’s recommendat ion
to extend copyright  to works intended for machine audiences invited
cont roversy because it  departed signif icant ly f rom the longstanding paradigm
that  copyright  was only available to human-readable works—a paradigm
codif ied in the 1909 Copyright  Act . Although the 1976 Copyright  Act  of f icially
overturned the ‘human-readable’ st ipulat ion established in 1909,24 the
copyright  of  machine-readable object  code was such a radical break that
several subsequent  cases debated it s legalit y. Not  unt il an appeals court
ruled decisively on the issue in 198325 was it  made clear that  object  code was,
indeed, protected under the amended Copyright  Act .26
In a lengthy dissent  included in the CONTU Final Report, Commission member
John Hersey, a creat ive writer, focused on the implicat ions of  this novel theory
of  machines as audience. Hersey considered object  code a ‘device’ or a
‘mechanical form’ rather than a text , and warned that  copyright  for such a
device ‘forcibly wrench[es]’27 the law, threatening to ‘pollute’ the stock of
exist ing copyrightable ‘writ ings’ and perhaps even ‘blur and merge human and
mechanical communicat ion’ (36). He began by highlight ing this dramat ic
divergence f rom established assumpt ions about  audience for copyrighted
works:
Works of  authorship have always been intended to be circulated
to human beings and to be used by them—to be read, heard, or
seen, for either pleasurable or pract ical ends. Computer programs,
in their [object  code] phase, are addressed to machines. (28)
Although Hersey admit ted that  machine code can be read by some specially-
t rained programmers, he claimed that  ‘if  a skilled programmer can “read” a
program in it s […], machine-readable form, it  is only in the sense that  a skilled
home-appliance technician can “read” the equally mechanical printed circuit s
of  a television receiver’ (30). In his explanat ion of  object  code, Hersey likened
object  code to a device that  cont rols a drill and argued that  few would agree
to copyright  protect ion for this mechanically-instant iated drill inst ruct ion. In
cont rast  to Hersey’s analogy, the larger Commission analogized object  code
to writ ing—albeit  funct ional writ ing. Thus, both Hersey and CONTU employed
metaphors for their arguments about  the nature of  code and it s audience.
In Hersey’s dissent , we see a theory of  what  it  means to ‘read’ or ‘write’
something: ‘writ ing’ is an act  of  communicat ion. Without  ‘reading’—by his logic,
the human capabilit y of  understanding at  the other end—a text  cannot
communicate and therefore, it  cannot  be ‘writ ing.’ Hersey’s concern about  the
extension of  copyright  to works for machine audiences suggests that  he
imagined a ‘universal audience’ for code similar to the ‘universal audience’ for
the lit erary works he produced as a creat ive writer; that  is, he imagined only
human readers as an audience. In cont rast , CONTU’s recommendat ion to
t reat  object  code as a ‘lit erary work’ implies a theory of  reading and writ ing
that  includes not  only humans but  also machines. If  machines are legit imate
audiences for lit erary works in CONTU’s formulat ion, then aesthet ic qualit y
and successful communicat ion need not  be relevant  to the determinat ion of
copyrightabilit y. Indeed, quot ing f rom a case that  allowed for an arbit rary
st ring of  words to be copyrighted, CONTU asserted that  successful
communicat ion is not  a prerequisite for copyright .28 CONTU also invoked case
law to remind readers that  courts are not  in the posit ion to judge the
aesthet ic value of  writ ing.29 Thus, CONTU’s Final Report implies a wider
‘universal audience’ for copyrightable works than the one imagined by
Hersey.30
In addit ion to their focus on the audience for code, CONTU addressed the
audience for the law it self—those who might  enjoy copyright  protect ion for
their computer programs as well as those whose programs the new law might
const rain. Concordant  with the ends of  copyright  law, CONTU was explicit ly
interested in support ing a compet it ive market  of  creat ive products f rom a
wide variety of  producers.31 Sof tware producers were increasingly
dif ferent iat ing themselves f rom hardware producers at  the t ime; CONTU
observes this and notes that  because ‘program writ ing requires very lit t le
capital investment ,’ it  was possible for a very diverse marketplace for
sof tware to thrive (ibid.). An increasingly diverse marketplace meant  that
copyright  was important  for computer programs, especially for smaller
operat ions unable to af ford other means of  protect ion (35). Copyright  should
be af forded to large and small f irms alike, CONTU asserted, and it  explicit ly
rejected a proposal that  large f irms be ‘disfavored’ by the new law (25).
Addit ionally, CONTU acknowledged the end users of  computer programs and
recommended that  they should have the right  to alter programs in order to
meet  their needs (13). In all of  these assert ions, the Commission
demonst rated a keen at tent ion to the audience for the law—those who would
use the new law to their advantage, whose product ion might  be encouraged
or st if led, and who might  use the technologies protected by the law.
Commissioner Hersey’s dissent , however, reveals the lacunae in CONTU’s
‘universal audience’ for the law. First , he is concerned with the ef fect  on
independent  programmers. Although CONTU considered both small and large
sof tware f irms, Hersey claimed that  they envisioned these f irms only in
corporate contexts. He wrote,
the picture CONTU has been given, where rights in computer
programs are concerned, is that  the proprietor is almost  invariably
corporate. If  there is an individual ‘author,’ it  will be an author for
hire, whose creat ivit y is in st rict  harness and whose property rights
are nonexistent . (35)
Hersey went  on to illust rate his argument : CONTU was aggressively lobbied
by major indust rial corporat ions; lit t le input  was sought  f rom organizat ions
represent ing independent  sof tware producers; and CONTU ignored a survey
of  ‘smallish’ f irms that  recommended against  copyright  protect ion for
sof tware (35). Hersey warned Congress that  ‘copyright ing of  the machine
phases of  programs would be likely to st rengthen the posit ion of  the large
f irms, to reinforce the oligopoly of  these dominant  companies, and to inhibit
compet it ion f rom and among small independents’ (36). His concern for
independent  programmers is echoed in later debates about  patent  protect ion
for sof tware, as we will see below.
CONTU imagined the legal subjects for sof tware copyright  law as limited to
those who make, circulate and use sof tware. Hersey contended, however,
that  the general public is also implicated in any law, perhaps because he
foresaw the wider use of  sof tware among nonspecialists. He challenged the
commission by arguing that  normal cit izens would not  understand this new
applicat ion of  copyright : ‘Ask any cit izen in the st reet  whether a printed circuit
in a microprocessor in the emission cont rol of  his or her car is a copy of  a
literary work, and see what  answer you get ’ (33). The consequences for this
cognit ive dissonance are dire, and apparent ly go far beyond that  of  sof tware
product ion:
But  if  our government  tells the cit izens in the st reet  that  this is so
and makes it  law, what  then happens to the cit izen’s sense of
dist inct ion between works that  speak to the minds and senses of
men and women and works that  run machines—or, ult imately, the
cit izen’s sense of  the saving dist inct ion between human beings
themselves and machines themselves? (33)
Put  another way, Hersey warned that  legal subjects could be existentially
t roubled by the grant ing of  copyright  to works intended for non-human
audiences. CONTU acknowledged the potent ially dehumanizing danger of
computers in it s Final Report, but  contended that  copyright  of  computer code
was irrelevant  to the issue (26).
Hersey and the larger Commission’s dif ferent  ‘universal audiences’ for both
computer code and the copyright  law that  might  apply to code reveal some of
the polit ical tension behind CONTU’s recommendat ion to consider computer
code—especially object  code—a ‘lit erary work.’ Hersey const ructs a ‘universal
audience’ for sof tware copyright  law that  includes not  only the sof tware
indust ry but  also the larger public, and he then uses this const ruct ion to
reason about  the audience for code. In his vision, the law’s subjects would not
perceive circuit  diagrams as ‘texts,’ so Hersey’s audience for code excludes
machines. In cont rast , CONTU sees machines as legit imate audiences for the
‘writ ing’ of  computer code; works aimed at  machine audiences (e.g., object
code) are therefore worthy of  copyright . But  they imagine a narrower
‘universal audience’ for the law than Hersey; they picture the law’s subjects
only as sof tware users and producers working primarily in corporate contexts.
Congress ignored Hersey’s warnings and adopted the CONTU Report ’s
recommendat ions, so this corporately-inf lected ‘universal audience’ for
sof tware copyright  set  the legal terms for sof tware product ion in 1980.
Interest ingly, Apple v. Franklin, the 1983 decision that  af f irmed CONTU’s
recommendat ion that  machine-readable code be subject  to copyright ,
appeared to echo CONTU’s bias toward corporate f irms. The court  opened
their decision with a comparison of  the market  values of  Apple versus Franklin,
assert ing that  Apple—who won the suit—was a far larger and more
successful company. The establishment  of  computer code as a ‘lit erary work’
in copyright  law therefore init iated not  only an implied legal sort ing of  human
and machinic audiences for code but  also a set  of  legal imbalances between
corporate and independent  audiences for laws regarding code.
The decision to extend copyright  to code was pragmat ic rather than
aesthet ic, but  it  ref lected a nascent  approach to code as a form of  creat ive
expression. In 1974, the same year as CONTU was formed, Donald Knuth
famously declared, ‘[p]rogramming is best  regarded as the process of
creat ing works of  lit erature, which are meant  to be read.’32 Code poet ry,
which began in the 1960s and became popular in the 1990s when it  was writ ten
in Perl and other f lexible, high-level programming languages, blurred the line
between expression and funct ion, dramat ically enact ing Knuth’s assert ion.
Recent  approaches to code through Crit ical Code Studies t reat  code as a
literary work.33 And a f lourishing scene of  independent  programmers in the
open source movement  exchange code online, compet ing for ‘elegance’ and
leveraging code’s status as a ‘lit erary work’ under copyright  law to protect
their f ree exchange. As we will see in the next  sect ion, the de facto legal
sanct ioning of  code as creat ive expression allowed for it  to be protected
under the First  Amendment .
Code as Speech
The list  of  act ivit ies protected as ‘speech’ under the First  Amendment
includes not  only the paradigmat ic oral expression, but  also textual writ ing,
methods of  dress, gestures, visual art , and computer code. Excluded f rom
speech protect ions are certain forms of  conduct , especially if  they endanger
others (e.g., yelling “f ire” in a crowded theater). The two series of  cases
addressed in this sect ion, Bernstein v. United States (1996-1999) and Universal
City Studios vs. Reimerdes / Corley (2000-2001), weigh whether code is more
like speech or conduct  under the First  Amendment .34 Both cases const rue
code as a kind of  speech as well as a form of  creat ive expression, as
suggested by code’s status as a ‘lit erary work’ under copyright  law. In
Bernstein, the t rial court  reasoned that  because code had been allowed
copyright , it  had expressive elements that  could be protected by the First
Amendment .35 Although copyright  law worked to just if y code as ‘protected
speech’ in Bernstein, copyright  worked against  code’s protect ion as speech in
Universal. In Universal, the entertainment  indust ry’s copyright  and t rade secret
claims t rumped the ‘hacker’ magazine 2600’s f ree speech claims to dist ribute
a part icular algorithm. In both cases, the chosen metaphor for code was
crit ical for determining not  only what  sort  of  legal protect ions code was
allowed, but  also how lawmakers at  the t ime envisioned code and how it
should be allowed to circulate.
The metaphors at  play in Bernstein tested whether cryptographic source code
was ‘speech,’ and therefore protected under the First  Amendment , or whether
it  was a ‘defense art icle,’ and therefore subject  to regulat ions by the US
government . Along with various kinds of  weapons, high-level cryptography,
because it  is reserved for government  communicat ion, is classif ied as a
‘defense art icle’ under US State Department  regulat ions.36 In Bernstein, the
State Department  invoked these regulat ions to claim that  PhD student  Daniel
Bernstein’s cryptographic code needed to be licensed by them before he
could publish it . However, Bernstein insisted that  ‘computer code inscribed on
paper, like any non-English language, is speech protected by the First
Amendment .’37 The State Department  countered that  the source code for
Bernstein’s encrypt ion program was not  speech but  conduct—which is
af forded fewer legal protect ions—because it  was funct ional rather than
communicat ive (ibid.).
The Dist rict  Court  decided that  ‘source code is speech protected by the First
Amendment ’ 38; therefore, Bernstein had the right  to circulate his algorithm as
f reely as he might  ‘speak’ it . Reject ing the State Department ’s argument  that
funct ional speech was somehow less like speech, the court  argued, ‘An
extension of  that  argument  assumes that  once language allows one to
actually do something, like play music or make lasagne, the language is no
longer speech. The logic of  this proposit ion is dubious at  best . It s support  in
First  Amendment  law is nonexistent .’39 Here we see metaphors of  code’s
funct ionalit y to harmless funct ional writ ing: cooking and music. When the State
Department  persisted in arguing that  Bernstein’s algorithm was not  ‘mere
speech,’ the Court  chast ised them for ‘assuming that  the funct ionalit y of
speech can somehow be divorced f rom the speech it self ,’ implying Speech
Act  Theory concepts about  speech as act ion.40 The Court  reminded them
that  ‘[t ]his cont roversy is before this court  precisely because there is no clear
line between communicat ion and it s consequences’(ibid.).
US courts had previously established that  the language in which
communicat ion happens is immaterial to whether or not  it  is speech, and in
Bernstein, they insisted that  code could also be considered a kind of  language:
‘All [languages] part icipate in a complex system of  understood meanings
within specif ic communit ies. Even object  code, which direct ly inst ructs the
computer, operates as a “language.”’41 Echoing the CONTU debates as well
as the debates surrounding the 1909 Copyright  Act , the Court  indicated that
machines can part icipate in communicat ive acts:
Like source code converted to object  code, [a player piano roll]
‘communicates’ to and directs the inst rument  it self , rather than
the musician, to produce the music. That  does not  mean it  is not
speech. Like music and mathemat ical equat ions, computer
language is just  that , language, and it  communicates informat ion
either to a computer or to those who can read it . (ibid., 1435)
Although the cent ral metaphor of  speech is dif ferent , the decision in Bernstein
I relies on an argument  similar to that  in the CONTU Final Report: writ ing
directed at  a computer is a form of  ‘communicat ion,’ even though it  is also
funct ional. Bernstein’s metaphor of  code as funct ional speech prevailed over
the State Department ’s metaphor of  code as conduct  when the Appeals
Court  decided that  the government ’s ‘prepublicat ion licensing regime
challenged by Bernstein applies direct ly to scient if ic expression […therefore]
it  const itutes an impermissible prior rest raint  on speech.’42
The debate over code’s status as ‘speech’ illuminates both Bernstein’s and
the US State Department ’s const ruct ion of  audiences for certain forms of
code, as well as the polit ical implicat ions of  these const ruct ions. Bernstein
imagined an audience not  only of  his academic peers but  also of  private
cit izens who desired high-level cryptography for their personal communicat ion.
The State Department  agreed that  people might  want  high-level
cryptography for their personal communicat ion, but  they envisioned those
people as potent ial terrorists. Therefore, the Bernstein court ’s favoring of
Bernstein’s const ruct ion of  audience over the State Department ’s not  only
protected academic speech, but  it  also expanded the ‘universal audience’ for
cryptographic code to include private cit izens. The case pertains to the f ree
speech rights of  the public, the Court  argued, because of  cryptography’s
growing role in ensuring privacy and anonymity in cellular and digital
communicat ions among private cit izens. The Court  wrote, ‘Bernstein’s is a suit
not  merely concerning a small group of  scient ists laboring in an esoteric f ield,
but  also touches on the public interest  broadly def ined.’43 At  the heart  of  the
decision, then, was a new concept  about  the role of  computer code—
specif ically, cryptographic code—in public lif e. By 1999, digital communicat ion
was suf f icient ly important  for the Court  to protect  it s rights of  privacy through
protect ing the general use of  high-level cryptography.
Two years later, a decision in a dif ferent  case dramat ically decreased these
protect ions for the circulat ion of  code. In direct  cont rast  to Bernstein’s broad
vision of  speech protect ions for code, the court  in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley concluded, ‘The funct ionalit y of  computer code properly af fects the
scope of  it s First  Amendment  protect ion.’44 The Universal cases pit ted
‘hackers’ against  the movie indust ry: the defendants in Universal, associated
with the hacker magazine 2600, had dist ributed an algorithm online called
‘DeCSS’ that  ef fect ively ‘unlocked’ a form of  cryptographic ant i-piracy
securit y for DVDs.45 The Digital Millennium Copyright  Act  (DMCA)—a
legislat ive response to the entertainment  indust ry’s lobby to st rengthen
copyright  protect ion—was the operat ive law in the case and had gone into
ef fect  just  prior to Universal.46 Represented by Universal Studios, the movie
indust ry contended that  the DMCA’s ‘ant i-circumvent ion’ and ‘ant i-t raf f icking’
provisions out lawed the DeCSS code and it s dist ribut ion. In accordance with
the DMCA, the indust ry threatened websites host ing the code with ‘cease and
desist ’ let ters. However, some sites—such the popular hacker magazine
2600—lef t  the code online, as a polit ical statement  against  the DMCA and in
support  of  the f ree speech protect ions of  code established in Bernstein. In the
arguments and conclusions in the case, lit igants professed conf lict ing visions
of  how entertainment  should be used and who should be using it . The
entertainment  indust ry’s imposit ion of  their narrowly const ructed audience
onto the more general, actual audience for copyrighted works in Universal
provoked vigorous protests and content ious debates about  copyright  and
f ree speech online. In these ‘DeCSS protests,’ people dist ributed the DeCSS
code in forms such as haikus and images to make the point  that  code was a
form of  creat ive expression and should be protected as such. In so doing,
they registered their reject ion of  the court ’s narrow percept ion of  audience
and use for these copyrighted works.
The admixture of  speech and conduct  in the DeCSS code complicated the
applicat ion of  the DMCA in Universal just  as it  had complicated the protect ion
of  code-based cryptography in Bernstein. The Bernstein Appeals Court  had
rejected the government ’s argument  that  any funct ionalit y should render
expression a form of  conduct  because such an argument  would be untenable
for future digital communicat ions: ‘The fact  that  computers will soon be able
to respond to spoken commands, for example, should not  confer on the
government  the unfet tered power to impose prior rest raints on speech in an
ef fort  to cont rol it s “funct ional” aspects.’47 The Universal courts also found it
dif f icult  to separate the expressive f rom the funct ional in code and were
forced to make a decision on code as an ineluctable combinat ion of  both:
[…] computer code can instant ly cause a computer to accomplish
tasks and instant ly render the result s of  those tasks available
throughout  the world via the Internet . These realit ies of  what  code
is and what  it s normal funct ions are require a First  Amendment
analysis that  t reats code as combining nonspeech and speech
elements, i.e., funct ional and expressive elements.48
Several prominent  computer science professors test if ied before the court  in
Universal v. Reimerdes that  although the separat ion of  speech f rom non-
speech elements was impossible for code, code should be governed as
speech, as it  had been in Bernstein, because it s unfet tered circulat ion was
essent ial to research.49
Cont rary to Bernstein, however, the courts in Universal decided that  the
funct ional aspects of  the code t rumped it s expressive aspects. The court  in
Universal v. Corley declared that  ‘the capacit y of  a decrypt ion program like
DeCSS to accomplish unauthorized – indeed, unlawful – access to materials in
which the Plaint if f s have intellectual property rights must  inform and limit  the
scope of  it s First  Amendment  protect ion.’50 Again, metaphors for the code in
quest ion were key to the decision. Here, DeCSS is a like an unauthorized key:
CSS is like a lock on a homeowner’s door, a combinat ion of  a safe,
or a securit y device at tached to a store’s products. DeCSS is
computer code that  can decrypt  CSS. In it s basic funct ion, it  is like
a skeleton key that  can open a locked door, a combinat ion that
can open a safe, or a device that  can neut ralize the securit y
device at tached to a store’s products. (ibid.)
Extending the allusions to thef t , the court  went  so far as to repeat  the
indust ry’s descript ion of  DeCSS as ‘a digital crowbar’ [ibid., 453n.28].
The metaphor changes in Universal v. Reimerdes, where DeCSS’s
resemblance to ‘disease’ and ‘assassinat ion’ reveals the danger the court  felt
it  posed to society. The Court  wrote:
The spread of  means of  circumvent ing access to copyrighted
works in digital form, however, is analogous to a propagated
outbreak epidemic. Finding the original source of  infect ion (e.g., the
author of  DeCSS or the f irst  person to misuse it ) accomplishes
nothing, as the disease (inf ringement  made possible by DeCSS
and the result ing availabilit y of  decrypted DVDs) may cont inue to
spread f rom one person who gains access to the circumvent ion
program or decrypted DVD to another.51
Under Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s formulat ion, this metaphor fuses
concepts of  code and disease to suggest  that  code can inf ilt rate and corrupt
the ‘healthy’ system of  DMCA copyright  protect ion. Intertwining the f igurat ive
disease metaphor with another metaphor of  danger—assassinat ion—the
Reimerdes court  echoes the State Department ’s argument  about  code’s
dest ruct ive potent ial in Bernstein and provides rhetorical proof  that  code can
‘disable systems upon which the nat ion depends’:
Computer code is expressive. To that  extent , it  is a mat ter of
First  Amendment  concern. But  computer code is not  purely
expressive any more than the assassinat ion of  a polit ical f igure is
purely a polit ical statement . Code causes computers to perform
desired funct ions. It s expressive element  no more immunizes it s
funct ional aspects f rom regulat ion than the expressive mot ives of
an assassin immunize the assassin’s act ion. 52
As James Boyle writes in his lucid descript ion of  Universal v. Reimerdes, ‘it  is
here that  the defendants lose the bat t le of  the metaphors.’53 These
f igurat ive metaphors direct  our at tent ion and fear to code as ‘conduct ’ and
help to build the legal metaphor for code as a form of  conduct  rather than
speech. If  code is a digital crowbar, a vector of  disease, or a polit ical
assassinat ion, it  follows—at  least  for the courts in Universal—that  the
funct ional qualit ies of  code are too dangerous to protect  it s expressive
qualit ies.
One aspect  of  the Universal courts’ privileging of  code’s funct ion over it s
expression proved part icularly cont roversial: their declarat ion that  hyperlinking
to DeCSS code was a form of  ‘t raf f icking’ in ‘ant i-circumvent ion devices,’ and
therefore, a DMCA violat ion. In his opinion in Reimerdes, Judge Kaplan
admit ted that  this interpretat ion of  the DMCA’s ant i-t raf f icking provision
might  produce an unfortunate ‘chilling ef fect ’ on expression. However, he
claimed that  ‘the potent ial chilling ef fect  of  DMCA liabilit y cannot  ut terly
immunize web site operators f rom all act ions for disseminat ing circumvent ion
technology’ (note his repeated use of  the disease-verb ‘immunize’).54 Judge
Kaplan did not  specif y who a ‘web site operator’ might  be, but  given the broad
access to the World Wide Web at  the t ime, this could have included anyone
who used a f ree online blog or put  up their own webpage to post  links to the
Web. With this broad access, it  was bold to assert  that  even hyperlinking to
DeCSS code was prohibited by the DMCA. Mit igat ing this assert ion
somewhat , he declared that  hyperlinkers must  be at  least  aware of  their
act ions to be prosecuted (ibid., 341). However, the Court  tacit ly assumes
users of  code (even through simple Web-based interfaces) have both a legal
and a technical savvy that  was and is st ill rare amongst  actual Web-writers.
In these cases that  const rue code as a form of  speech, we see several
compet ing visions of  the potent ial users and writers of  code—that  is, several
‘universal audiences’ of  code imagined by the courts and the lit igants. In
Bernstein, the courts st ruck down the government ’s prior rest raint  on the
scient if ic expression of  cryptographic researchers. They also acknowledged
that  while the scient if ic audience for cryptographic source code was small and
specialized, the case resonated much further. The Bernstein Appeals Court
specif ically addressed the rights of  US cit izens to communicate privately and
indicated that , in this digital age, undue government  rest rict ions on
cryptographic code inf ringed on those rights. In cont rast , although the
Reimerdes Court  admits that  Linux users might  deploy DeCSS for non-
inf ringing purposes, it  declares Linux’s dist ribut ion to be too small to balance
against  the many others who would use DeCSS for inf ringing purposes. We
might  say that  the Universal courts imagine a ‘universal audience’ of  DVD-
users who rely—or should rely—on only mass-market  sof tware and hardware.
Ironically, the code in Bernstein—an encrypt ion algorithm that  might  cloak
terrorist  act ivit ies—was deemed less dangerous than the code in Universal —
a DVD ant i-encrypt ion algorithm that  had become defunct  by the t ime of  the
Corley t rial.55 In Bernstein, the potent ial harm was directed toward the US
government  and private cit izens, whereas in Universal, the potent ial harm was
directed at  the movie indust ry. Moreover, the economic interests of  the
indust ry seemed to f igure prominent ly in the Universal courts’ reasoning. The
passage of  the DMCA in 1998 and the terrorist  at tacks of  9/11/2001 might
explain some of  the shif t  in the courts’ perspect ives between Bernstein and
Universal. But  comparing the two cases, it  appears that  the general
populat ion’s use of  computer code became a cent ral threat  for the
entertainment  indust ry around the turn of  the 21st  century. Indeed, the
decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., contemporary with the decision
in Universal, supports this claim.56
The prevalence of  speech through digital means, especially online, makes
code increasingly cent ral to speech protect ions in the minds of  many writers.
For example, a more recent  debate about  f ree speech protect ion of  code
concerns Dist ributed Denial of  Service (DDoS) at tacks, especially those
defending Wikileaks and conducted by the online force ‘Anonymous.’ If  code is
‘speech,’ then are these online protests akin to angry let ters and
demonst rat ions? Or, if  code is ‘conduct ,’ then are they more like riots or sit -
ins? Where does the government ’s compelling interest  in the speech and code
that  we write and use verge into polit ical censorship? In the conclusion, I revisit
these ways that  Bernstein and Universal serve as backdrops for contemporary
quest ions about  speech and code on the Internet  as a form of  polit ical and
technological protest .
Code as Machine
Programming the f irst  computers in the early 1940s involved physically
conf iguring the machine rather than writ ing text . Ironically, this f irst
manifestat ion of  code—code as conf igurat ion of  machine—was the last  to be
recognized in the law. The sof tware that  code comprises is metaphorically a
form of  machine in patent  law, the intellectual property regime that  most
typically pertains to manufacturing contexts. Patent  law’s manufacturing
context  is one reason patent  protect ion for sof tware const ructs corporat ions
as the paradigmat ic writers of  code.57 The ontology of  code as machine not
only presupposes it s producers, but  it  also highlights it s abilit y to do things in
the world.
The patentabilit y of  sof tware was established not  by Congress or any
specif ic deliberat ion on the wisdom or feasibilit y of  doing so, but  instead
through a series of  cases concerning algorithms beginning in the 1980s. This
case t rajectory has incrementally led to a more corporate vision of  the
‘universal audience’ for computer code in patent  law. To locate the origin and
potent ial implicat ions of  this bias toward corporate composers of  code, in this
sect ion I out line the t rajectory of  cases and metaphors that  led to patent
protect ions for computer code. Because the specif ic case history is
complicated and a full t reatment  is outside of  the scope of  this art icle, I have
zoomed out  to analyze the series of  cases through their cont rolling legal
reasoning rather than their specif ic language.
The availabilit y of  patent  protect ion for computer code has long been
debated and of ten been proposed, as the CONTU Final Report indicated. In
the 1960s, President  Johnson assembled an advisory group to review the US
Patent  and T rademark Of f ice’s policies on sof tware patents; the group
concluded in their 1966 report  that  sof tware should be specif ically excluded as
patentable subject  mat ter.58 In the 1970s, several cases concerning patents
on algorithms suggested that  sof tware was unpatentable because it  was too
close to math, which is not  patentable subject  mat ter.59 In the 1980s and early
1990s, various patent  cases about  chemical processes and ‘business
methods’ chipped away at  the assumed prohibit ion against  ‘method’ patents
—and, by extension, sof tware patents. These cases indicated that  any
physical component  could make a process patentable,60 and that  the use of
the word ‘machine’ in a patent  descript ion rendered the described object  a
‘physical device’61—a magical t ransformat ion that  gestures toward Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ‘metaphorical fusion.’ The decision that  f inally
conf irmed the patentabilit y of  sof tware in the US was State Street Bank v.
Signature Financial Group (1998), which concerned a patent  obtained on a
‘business method’ implemented in sof tware. In their decision, the Federal
Circuit  Court  insisted that  any bar on the patentabilit y of  ‘business methods’
(and, by metaphorical extension, sof tware) was a misunderstanding, and they
‘take this opportunit y to lay this ill-conceived except ion to rest .’62 Patents for
sof tware had been granted before the decision in State Street, but  their of f icial
sanct ioning by the court  opened the f loodgates on applicat ions.63
Patents require extensive legal knowledge and expense to obtain, which
makes them more favorable for larger corporat ions. Unlike copyright , which is
granted to a qualif ying work as soon as it  is ‘f ixed,’ a US patent  must  be
acquired through an applicat ion to the US Patent  and T rademark Of f ice
(USPTO). Patents may be obtained on ‘any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composit ion of  mat ter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof ’ (35 U.S.C. §101) as long as it  is ‘novel’ (§102) and ‘nonobvious’ (§103).
Patent  applicants must  disclose suf f icient  detail on their invent ion to ‘enable
any person skilled in the art  to which it  pertains [the ‘PHOSITA’]64. . .to make
and use the same’ (35 U.S.C. §112). The disclosure ostensibly gives
informat ion about  the invent ion to the public, who may pract ice the invent ion
once the limited monopoly expires. It  is more expensive and dif f icult  to acquire
a patent  than a copyright , but  patents allow narrower except ions for fair use
and st ronger protect ions against  inf ringement . These more robust  patent
rights are balanced with a shorter durat ion than copyright : a US patent  lasts
for only 20 years.65
Because the operat ing metaphor for code in patent  law is machine,
sof tware’s funct ionalit y is foregrounded as it s dominant  characterist ic. The
machine metaphor for sof tware also f igured prominent ly in a ‘Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protect ion of  Computer Programs’ published by several
inf luent ial legal theorists and technologists prior to the legal sanct ioning of
patents for sof tware in State Street. Pref iguring the speech vs. conduct  debate
about  code in Bernstein, Samuelson, et  al. argue that  text  is an ill-f it t ing
metaphor for sof tware because code ‘behaves’. They go on to suggest
‘machine’ as a bet ter metaphor:
T radit ional lit erary works, such as books, do not  behave.
Programs, like other machines, do. Programs have a dual character
because they are textual works created specif ically to bring about
some set  of  behaviors. We at tempt  to capture this int riguing dual
nature of  sof tware by describing sof tware as a machine whose
medium of  const ruct ion happens to be text .66
The authors indicate that  the establishment  of  an apt  legal metaphor for
sof tware is necessary so that  it s protect ion under the law will f it  sof tware’s
uses, behavior, and market  value. But  the tensions implied in sof tware’s dual
nature as text  and machine renders those both of  those legal metaphors
individually inadequate. Rather than ret rof it t ing sof tware into established legal
metaphor, then, the authors propose a new (sui generis) form of  protect ion
specif ic to sof tware. Congress has not  opted to adopt  their proposal,
however; nor have they responded fully to the US Supreme Court ’s more
recent  suggest ion to review the patent  system for technologies such as
sof tware.67 If  and when they do, the highly cont roversial machine metaphor
for sof tware may be revised. Unt il t hen, patent  applicat ions for sof tware rely
heavily on calling sof tware a ‘machine,’ thus legally, rhetorically, and
somewhat  magically turning their claimed sof tware into machine.
Although the legal status of  sof tware patents status is now established in the
US, it  is heavily crit iqued. Many have argued that  sof tware patents are on
shaky legal ground due to their lack of  ef f icacy for encouraging innovat ion,68
poor qualit y,69 inabilit y to dist inguish between patentable and nonpatentable
algorithms,70 and bias toward larger companies.71 For our purposes, the most
salient  crit ique of  sof tware patents is that  the code-writ ing populat ion implied
by patent  law is skewed toward larger f irms rather than individual or f reelance
programmers. The vast  legal and f inancial resources required to obtain, wield,
and defend against  patents imply a relat ively corporate, large, and well-
funded ‘universal audience’ for computer code’s protect ion under patent  law.
Because patent  costs are not  scaled to match applicants’ access to
resources, f inancial and logist ical factors make it  comparat ively more
expensive for smaller f irms to obtain and wield patents to protect  their
intellectual property.72 In accusat ions of  inf ringement , smaller f irms are also
disadvantaged by their relat ive lack of  legal knowledge. Because code-writ ing
occurs in so many dif ferent  contexts and venues, it  is nearly impossible to
know all possible patents that  might  bear on any part icular sof tware project .73
Yet , as in many areas of  the law, ignorance of  patents is no defense.74 Even if
f irms f ind the patent  quest ionable or the accusat ion bogus, they will of ten
license a patent  rather than challenging it  in court  because it  is much easier
and cheaper to do so. Because of  these dynamics of  patent  law, small f irms,
independent  coders, and open source developers75 cannot  escape the
patent  system, even if  they do not  f ile for patents themselves.
The bias toward corporate ent it ies in patent  law for sof tware stands in
cont rast  with the diversif ying pool of  people writ ing code.76 Increasingly
accessible programming languages, cheaper hardware, and the availabilit y of
tutorials and plat forms for code on the Web have made code-writ ing more
accessible to casual coders. These casual coders may not  know that  patent
law governs their writ ing, much less know how to claim their sof tware as
‘novel’ and ‘nonobvious’ in order to apply for a patent . In Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tytecha’s terms, then, the ‘universal audience’ assumed by patent
law dif fers signif icant ly f rom it s ‘concrete audience’—the actual pool of
people subject  to patent  law regarding sof tware. Several legal theorists have
argued that  this disparit y between various f irms’ ef fect ive access to
sof tware patents indicates a broken patent  system.77 To underscore that
point , independent  developers widely reject  patent  protect ion for sof tware,
and of ten instead embrace copyright  protect ion because it  does not  require
funds, expert ise, or regist rat ion to obtain. 78
It  is not  clear if  the courts deciding this t rajectory of  cases about  algorithms
for business, manufacturing, and scient if ic purposes were thinking about  the
contexts for sof tware development . But  regardless of  whether courts and
Congress intended to disfavor smallt ime sof tware developers through
changes in patent  protect ion, their act ions indicate that  they were primarily
considering well-funded, well-organized corporat ions when making those
changes. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest , lawmakers need not
know or intend their laws to have certain ef fects in order for those ef fects to
occur. And the law can subt ly shape technologies for part icular groups of
users, producers, and contexts even if  it  is does not  explicitly name or favor
those populat ions or contexts.
Conclusion: The unrepresented audience f ights back
Each legal metaphor for code of fers a dif ferent  paradigm for where code can
go, what  it  can do, and who is allowed to write and circulate it . By looking more
closely at  the metaphors for code, we can see some ways that  the law
const ructs writers, dist ributors, and consumers of  computer code. Since code
now comprises much of  our inf rast ructure for polit ics and expression, as well
as the inf rast ructure for modern lif e through elect ricit y grids, t raf f ic signals,
and microwaves, the ‘universal audience’ implied when the dif ferent  legal
metaphors were established may t ranslate into who cont rols these
inf rast ructures in the future.
Yet  coders are not  simply determined by lawmakers. Invested in what  the law
has to say about  code, various coding communit ies have pushed back on
lawmakers’ seemingly corporat ized ‘universal audience’ for code. Equipped
with some knowledge about  cont ract  law, as well as the abilit y to write code
that  funct ions as a form of  law by circumscribing some uses and promot ing
others, the ‘concrete audience’ for code has managed to carve space for
themselves to write—if  not  in of f icial laws, at  least  in their coding pract ices.
Some legal subjects have protested what  they perceive as a corporate bias
in intellectual property laws current ly being writ ten, point ing to the fact  that
heavy corporate lobbying inf luenced the passage of  intellectual property laws
such as the DMCA, the America Invents Act , and closed-door negot iat ions for
ACTA (Ant i-Counterfeit ing T rade Agreement ). Legal and digital protests
against  these laws have been part icularly vigorous where they const rict  the
writ ing and dist ribut ion of  computer code: for example, the Elect ronic
Freedom Foundat ion has raised money, writ ten briefs to courts, and
conducted online publicit y campaigns to t ry to f ight  this corporate bias in
intellectual property laws concerning sof tware patents and online music
databases. We can also see resistance in the creat ive t ranslat ions of  DMCA-
violat ing DeCSS code into poems and songs by people who perceived the
banning of  the DeCSS code as censorship. Other code-based protests
against  the corporate bias in laws about  code include: open source sof tware
licensing such as the General Public License (GPL); the shut tering of  Wikipedia
on 18 January 2012 to protest  the Stop Online Piracy Act  (SOPA), then under
considerat ion in Congress; and Dist ributed Denial of  Service (DDoS) at tacks
orchest rated by the loosely networked group called ‘Anonymous’ in order to
take down corporate websites.
I contend that  Anonymous, the Elect ronic Freedom Foundat ion, and the open
source community are highly aware of  the polit ical tensions in the rhetorical
const ruct ion of  ‘universal audience’ for laws, even if  they do not  call it  t hat .
Their resistance can be pegged, at  least  part ially, to their percept ion that  the
laws regarding computer code were not  writ ten with them in mind. If  we
conceive of  lawmakers implicit ly const ruct ing paradigmat ic users and
producers of  technology through their laws, then we can see protestors of
those laws as crit iquing that  const ruct ion, that  ‘universal audience.’ Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe this inter-audience crit ique as ‘audiences
pass[ing] judgment  on one another,’ and argued that  ‘part icular concrete
audiences are capable of  validat ing a concept  of  the universal audience which
characterizes them.’79 James Crosswhite explains how this crit ique f rom a
concrete audience can undermine the perceived validit y of  a ‘universal
audience’:
If  the part icular audience completely rejects the universal audience
const ructed f rom it , it  would weaken the argument  that  the
concept ion of  the universal audience is the right  one. Thus, the
part icular audience has a role in validat ing the universal audience,
in keeping it  f rom losing it s relat ion to the part icular audience in
quest ion.80
Here, we may be reminded of  CONTU Commissioner Hersey’s argument  that
laws that  go against  common sense can undermine their own legit imacy.
Perhaps the most  successful and longstanding crit ique of  the ‘universal
audience’ for legal governance of  code is the GPL, the sof tware license that
provides much of  the legal st ructure for f ree and open source sof tware
(F/OSS). The GPL, variat ions of  which are used for Mozilla Firefox, and the
Android and Linux Operat ing Systems, forces those who use and modify
licensed code to circulate their own code under the same terms.81 The GPL’s
progenitor, Richard Stallman, claims it  allows for sof tware ‘copylef t ’ because
it  twists copyright law toward purposes not  intended by lawmakers—purposes
more aligned with the programming community to which he belongs.82 When
he created the GPL, then, Stallman was a ‘concrete audience’ member
passing judgment  on the ‘universal audience’ lawmakers imagined for
copyright  law.
The Universal case series prompted another concrete audience’s crit ique that
potent ially undermined the legit imacy of  lawmakers’ ‘universal audience.’
Because creat ive users of  computer code did not  see their uses of  code
represented in the Universal court ’s assert ion that  code’s funct ional qualit ies
should t rump it s expressive qualit ies, they exercised their perceived rights to
creat ively express themselves in code through DeCSS dist ribut ions.83
Anthropologist  Gabriella Coleman t races the awakening understanding of  the
‘hacker’ community (represented here by F/OSS developers) and their
response to the law’s inf ringement  on their ‘speech’ in the DeCSS cases:
Although Richard Stallman certainly grounded the polit ics of
sof tware in a liberal vocabulary of  f reedom, and Daniel Bernstein’s
f ight  int roduced a far more legally sophist icated idea of  the First
Amendment  for sof tware, it  was only with the DeCSS cases that  a
more prolif ic and specif ic language of  f ree speech would come to
dominate among F/OSS developers, and circulate beyond F/OSS
proper. In the context  of  F/OSS development  in conjunct ion with
the DeCSS cases, the concept ion of  sof tware as speech became
a cultural realit y.84
As the metaphor of  code as speech was consolidated through the DeCSS
cases, non-corporate sof tware communit ies were galvanized to protect  the
f reedom of  speech for code and other technological expressions.85
Are the GPL, the DeCSS protests, and other legal or code-based protests
ef fect ively invalidat ing lawmakers’ ‘universal audience’ and inf luencing the
users, producers and contexts for code against  it s legal def init ions? Yes, in
some ways. Independent  coders have made space for their own coding
pract ices even if , at  t imes, they seem to go against  the paradigms of  code in
the law. Code-focused legal protests have part ially eroded the ef fect iveness
of  legal authorit y by defying it  or ‘hacking’ it . Millions of  lines of  code circulate
under the GPL, and the license’s ‘copylef t ’ st ipulat ions have been successfully
defended under copyright  law.86 Some code communit ies have developed
alternat ive laws that  bet ter f it  t heir needs. For instance, the Debian open
source community generates pseudo-laws that  help to draw them together
and delineate their boundaries.87 In other words, coding communit ies can use
their laws to const ruct  their own ‘universal audience’ that  encompasses them
as well as def ines them as a community.88 As Coleman argues, we might
understand this process as ‘jurisgenesis,’ Robert  Cover’s theory of
communit ies’ const ruct ion of  laws that  diverge f rom stat ist  interpretat ions of
the law.89 Of f icial laws are always unevenly enforced—laws regarding code in
part icular because of  legal dif f icult ies with interpretat ion and jurisdict ion.
Moreover, since code can ef fect ively funct ion as law, creat ive coders can
essent ially program their own visions of  audience in their work. As a result ,
coding communit ies can, in pract ice, shape the ways that  the law governs
code, even if  they cannot  direct ly change the paradigms const ructed by
lawmakers.
As is of ten noted, code can be a form of  law. But  in the law, the metaphors
deployed for code complicate that  assert ion. If  code is text , then it  is
authored and read—by humans as well as machines—and it  can be creat ive
and expressive as well as funct ional. If  code is speech, then it  earns certain
protect ions by the US government—at  least  unt il it  verges closer to conduct
that  might  endanger certain corporate or governmental interests. If  code is
machine, then it s funct ionalit y can be cordoned of f  f rom it s expression and
monopolized under the terms of  patent  law. The fact  that  code is
simultaneously text , speech and machine in US law provides a window into the
complex manifestat ions, funct ions, users and uses of  code in contemporary
society.
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